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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

:

v.

:

C. DEAN LARSEN,

:

Defendant-Appellee.

Case No. 910314

Category No. 2

:

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
The following points are submitted in reply to the
arguments presented in defendant's responsive brief.
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT II
GIVEN THE GENERALLY ACCEPTED MEANING OF THE
PHRASE "AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW," WHICH APPEARS
IN ARTICLE I, SECTION 8 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION, BAIL PENDING APPEAL IS PROPERLY
VIEWED AS A MATTER OF SUBSTANTIVE LAW
Defendant argues that bail pending appeal is a matter
r procedure rather than a matter of substantive law.
Acknowledging the split in the case law on the issue, he relies
most heavily on federal cases which held that the provisions of
the 1984 Bail Reform Act relating to bail pending appeal are
procedural and therefore their retroactive application does not
violate the ex post

facto

clause. While the federal cases lend

support to defendant's position and may serve to illustrate
further the split in the case law, those cases, unlike the state
cases cited by the State, did not resolve a direct conflict
between a court rule and a statute.

Therefore, the State

discussed the state cases instead of the federal cases.

Contrary to defendant's assertion, the view that bail
pending appeal is a matter of substantive law rather than
procedure is entirely consistent with article I, section 8 of the
Utah Constitution, which now provides that •• [p]ersons convicted
of a crime are bailable pending appeal only
(emphasis added).

as prescribed

by law"

Citing minutes from a meeting of the

Constitutional Revision Committee (CRC)1 as his only authority,
defendant asserts that the State erroneously implies that the
phrase "as prescribed by law" means as prescribed by statute.
Although the CRC may have intended differently, that phrase has
been interpreted by the courts to mean prescribed by statute.
See, e.g., Manchin v. Brown, 296 S.E.2d 909, 915 (W. Va. 1982)
("The phrases 'prescribed by law' and 'provided by law' mean
prescribed or provided by statutes."); Frans Pets, Inc. v. Aqqen,
443 N.Y.S.2d 607, 608 (1981) ("The expression 'prescribed by law'
refers to statutory provisions only."); Litchfield Elementary
School v. Babbitt, 125 Ariz. 215, 608 P.2d 792, 798 (Ariz. App.
1980) ("The term 'as may be prescribed by law' means as provided
by legislative amendment."); Truiillo v. Tanuz, 85 N.M. 35, 508
P.2d 1332, 1337 (N.M. App. 1973) ("'Provided by law' means
'provided by statute law.'"); State ex rel. Wilson v. Weir, 106
Mont. 526, 79 P.2d 305, 308 (1938) ("The words 'as may be
1

The CRC was created "to make recommendations to the
governor and the Legislature as to specific proposed
constitutional amendments." Utah Code Ann. § 63-54-3 (1989).
As a mere advisory body to the legislature, the CRC does not set
legislative intent. Nor would the CRC's intent override an
interpretation of particular constitutional language by this
Court.
2

prescribed by law' . . . mean as may be prescribed by act of the
legislative assembly.")•

See also Black's Law Dictionary 1224

(6th ed. 1990) ("Provided by law.

This phrase when used in a

constitution or statute generally means prescribed or provided by
some statute.").
Although it appears this Court has not specifically
interpreted the phrase "as prescribed by law," it has interpreted
the very similar phrase "as may be established by law" to mean
established by statute.

State ex rel. Shields v. Barker, 50 Utah

189, 191, 167 P. 262, 263 (1917) ("To be 'established by law'
means just what it says, namely, by a law duly passed by the
lawmaking power of this state [i.e., the legislature].").

See

also State v. Cauble, 563 P.2d 775, 777 (Utah 1977) f "In State ex
rel. Shields v. Barker the words "established by law" or
"provided by law" were construed to mean the laws passed by the
law-making power of this state.").2

Furthermore, the Court

implicitly construed the phrase "prescribed by law" to mean
statutory law when it discussed the respective authority of the
attorney general and the county attorneys in State v. Jiminez,
588 P.2d 707, 708-09 (Utah 1978).

There, the Court first noted

that "[t]he Attorney General and the various County Attorneys are
constitutional officers and are empowered to perform such duties
'as prescribed by law'" (citing Utah Const, art. VII, §§ 1 and

"By law" technically includes constitutional amendments
passe, by the legislature, as well as statutes it enacts. See
Adriano v. Turner. 20 Utah 2d 350,351, 437 P.2d 891, 892 (1968)
(interpreting phrase "until otherwise provided by law").
3

18, and art- VIII, § 10), and then proceeded to refer to the
various statutes that prescribed the duties of those two offices.
588 P.2d at 707-09.
A basic principle of statutory construction is that the
legislature is presumed to be aware of this Court's decisions
when it acts.

Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281,

1284-85 (Utah 1987) (legislature is presumed aware of legal
context in which it acts).

See also Horton v. Royal Order of the

Sun, 821 P.2d 1167, 1169 (Utah 1991).

In asserting that the

State "is simply wrong" in its interpretation of the phrase
"prescribed by law," defendant fails to account for either
Shields, Cauble, or Jiminez, or the authority from other
jurisdictions which undermines his proposed interpretation of
that phrase.
Finally, this Court's standing committee on the rules
of criminal procedure recently approved amendments to rule 27,
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which track Utah Code Ann. §
77-20-10 (1990) (the proposed rule is contained in Appendix A ) .
The proposed rule further supports the view that bail pending
appeal is a matter of substantive law for the legislature.
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT III
EVEN IF THIS COURT WERE TO HOLD THAT BAIL
PENDING APPEAL IS STRICTLY A MATTER OF
PROCEDURE, THE LEGISLATURE OBVIOUSLY SOUGHT
TO AMEND THE PROCEDURE DICTATED BY THIS
COURT'S CASE LAW WHEN IT ENACTED UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-20-10 (1990)
Even if this Court were to hold that bail pending
appeal is strictly a matter of procedure, it would be unrealistic
4

to conclude that the legislature did not in effect amend rule 27
when it enacted section 77-20-10.
The parties agree on the legislature's intent in
enacting section 77-20-10: to bring Utah's bail pending appeal
law in line with federal law.

See Br. of Appellee at 25-27.

This marked a clear departure from the then-existing procedure
which was based on this Court's interpretation of rule 27. See
State v. Neelev, 707 P.2d 647 (Utah 1985); State v. Pappas, 696
P.2d 1188 (Utah 1985).

That the legislature did not specifically

state in its legislation that it was amending rule 27 should not
be fatal.
First, the legislature, obviously believing that it was
dealing with a matter of substantive law rather than procedure,
reasonably considered it unnecessary to include such a
statement.3

As is plain from the State's opening brief, there

was clear support for that belief.

Second, to hold under these

circumstances that passage of the legislation by a two-thirds
vote, the percentage required by the constitution for amendment
to a rule of procedure, would be to ignore the obvious intent of
the legislature and to elevate form or substance.

Moreover, in

arguing that H.B. 79's failure to clearly state an intent to
amend rule 27 renders section 77-20-10 ineffective as an
amendment to rule 27, defendant ignores the principle that

3

Where the legislature has known it was amending a rule of
procedure rather than enacting substantive law, it has used
explicit language to that effect. See, e.g., S.B. No. 181, 1990
Utah Laws ch. 201, §§ 2 & 3 (Appendix B ) .
5

"legislative enactments are endowed with a strong presumption of
validity and will not be declared unconstitutional unless there
is no basis upon which they can be construed as conforming to
constitutional requirements."

In re Criminal Investigation, 754

P.2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988).
At bottom, there is no dispute that the legislature
intended to change the law regarding bail pending appeal, and
there is no good re'ason for this Court to prohibit, on a
hypertechnical ground, that intent from taking effect.
REPLY TO DEFENDANTS POINT IV
DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACKS ARE EITHER
WITHOUT MERIT OR NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE
COURT
Defendant argues that the language of section 77-20-10
that requires proof the defendant will not pose a danger to the
"psychological, or financial and economic safety or well-being"
of any other person or the community if released "is so vague and
overbroad as to effectively and unreasonably preclude bail" in
violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
Appellee at 20-21.

Br. of

Beyond his failure to draw the necessary

distinctions between a "vagueness" challenge and an "overbreadth"
challenge*, defendant's vagueness argument (the only argument he
* Addressing this same defect in another case, this Court
said:
"Vagueness" goes to the issue of procedural
due process, i.e., whether the statute is
sufficiently explicit and clear to inform the
ordinary reader of common intelligence what
conduct is prohibited. On the other hand,
"overbreadth" relates to whether the statute
6

actually makes) is both premature and without merit.
First, defendant assumes without explanation that he
would not be granted release pending appeal if his case were
considered by the trial court under section 77-20-10. Because it
is not clear that defendant could not be granted release under
the statute, his vagueness claim, insofar as it represents an "as
applied" attack on the statute, is not properly before the Court.
Before a party may attack the constitutionality of a statute, it
must be clear that the party was or will be adversely affected by
that statute.

State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1207 (Utah 1989),

cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1018 (1990); State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d
502, 505 (Utah 1987) (per curiam); Pride Club, Inc. v. State, 25
Utah 2d 333, 336, 481 P.2d 669, 671 (1971).
Second, defendant's facial vagueness challenge does not
meet the requirements for such a challenge.

In making a facial

attack on the statute, defendant "must show that it is 'invalid
in toto

—

and therefore incapable of any valid application. . .

.' Unless the enactment is vague in all its applications, it is
ordinarily not unconstitutional on its face."

Greenwood v. City

of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991) (quoting
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 474 (1974)).

This defendant

has not done, merely questioning, without analysis, whether the
is so broad that it may prohibit
constitutionally protected behavior as well
as unprotected behavior — a question of
substantive due process.
State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502, 505 (Utah 1987) (citations
omitted).
7

terms "psychological safety" and "financial and economic safety"
are subject to meaningful definition.

Significantly, those terms

are frequently used by courts in other contexts, apparently
without much confusion as to their meaning.

See, e.g., Boyle v.

Donovan, 724 F.2d 681, 683 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (court
refers to "economic safety" of persons); State v. Draper, 162
Ariz. 433, 784 P.2d 259, 264 (Ariz. 1989) (court refers to
victim's "psychological safety"); People v. Maxwell, 162 Colo.
495, 427 P.2d 310, 312 (Colo. 1967) (en banc) (court refers to
"financial safety" of the public).
Finally, defendant erroneously argues that the statute
violates the eighth amendment because it does not distinguish
between misdemeanants and felons or violent and nonviolent
crimes.

The basic error in his claim is that this is

postconviction, as opposed to pretrial, bail.

Although he

acknowledges that there is no constitutional right to bail
pending appeal, defendant does not articulate why the legislature
in crafting a law for postconviction bail could not reasonably
apply the same legal standards to all convicted defendants.
Indeed, the Seventh Circuit correctly rejected a similar attack
on the 1984 Bail Reform Act in United States v. Bilanzich, 771
F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1985):
[The Bail Reform Act does not] violate the
prohibition on excessive bail contained in
the Eighth Amendment. The right to bail is
not an absolute one, and Congress may
restrict the category of cases in which bail
will be allowed. The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals, after examining the history
of the excessive bail clause, determined that
8

"the primary purpose is to limit the
judiciary," not the power of Congress. The
situation at bar does not implicate a denial
of bail before trial and conviction, but a
denial of bail after a court or a jury has
determined that the defendant has been proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The rate
of reversal of district court decisions is
extremely low, so that Congress' making bail
more difficult to obtain once an individual
has been found guilty is not unreasonable,
nor is it impermissible under the Eighth
Amendment.
771 F.2d at 299-300.
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT V
THE STATE AGREES THAT THIS COURT SHOULD LOOK
TO FEDERAL DECISIONS IN INTERPRETING SECTION
77-20-10
Defendant suggests that if the Court decides that
section 77-20-10 is the controlling law, it should interpret the
"substantial question" language of the statute as the Third
Circuit interpreted the same language in United States v. Miller,
753 F.2d 19 (3rd Cir. 1985).

The State agrees to the extent this

Court adopts the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of that language
in United States v. Affleck, 765 F.2d 944 (10th 1985)-

There,

the court adopted a slightly modified version of Miller's twostep analysis:
We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that "a
'substantial question' is one of more
substance than would be necessary to finding
that it was not frivolous. It is a 'close'
question or one that very well could be
decided the other way." rUnited States v.1
Giancola, 754 F.2d [898] at 901 [(11th Cir.
1985)]. In Miller, the Third Circuit said
that a "substantial" question under §
3143(b)(2) 'is one which is either novel,
which has not been decided by controlling
precedent, or which is fairly doubtful.'

9

We agree with the Eleventh Circuit, however,
that a question "which has not been decided
by controlling precedent" may not be
"substantial" under § 3143(b)(2). For
example, an issue may be "so patently without
merit that it has not been found necessary
for it to have been resolved. . . .
Similarly, there might be no precedent in
this circuit, but there may also be no real
reason to believe that this circuit would
depart from unanimous resolution of the issue
by other circuits."
765 F.2d at 952 (citations omitted).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments and those contained in
the State's opening brief, this Court should reverse the trial
court's holding that section 77-20-10 is unconstitutional and
remand this case for reconsideration of the release question
under the statute.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this / ? # W

of May, 1992.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAVID B. THOMPSON
(/
Assistant Attorney General

10
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

1

RULE 27. Stays pending appeal.

2

(a)

(1) A sentence of death shall be stayed if an appeal or

3

a petition for other relief is pending.

4

(2) A sentence of fine, imprisonment, or probation shall

5

be stayed if an appeal is taken and a certificate of probable

6

cause is issued.

7

(3) When an appeal is taken by the state, a stay of any

8

order of judgment in favor of the defendant may be granted by

9

the court upon good cause pending disposition of the appeal.

10
11

(b) A c e r t i f i c a t e of p r o b a b l e c a u s e shall b o issued if the
court hearing t h e a p p l i c a t i o n d e t e r m i n e s that t h o r o arc m e r i t o r i o u s
issued—that—should—fee—decided—fey—fehe—appellate

court.

A

13

c e r t i f i c a t e of p r o b a b l e c a u s e m a y b e issued b y t h e t r i a l court o r ,

14

if denied b y t h e t r i a l c o u r t , — b y t h e court t o w h o m a n appeal is

15

t a k e n . — T h e a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a c e r t i f i c a t e of p r o b a b l e cause shall

16

fee—*n—writing,

state—the

grounds—&e&—the—issuance—&€—£ke

17

c e r t i f i c a t e and s h a l l b o s e r v e d upon t h e p r o s e c u t i n g

IS

hearing—e«—fefee—application—&ex—a

19

shall be held a f t e r n o t i c e t o a l l p a r t i e s . — A p e r s o n w h o h a s been

20

found g u i l t y of an o f f e n s e and s e n t e n c e d t o a t e r m of i n c a r c e r a t i o n

21

in jail o r o r i s o n , and w h o h a s filed a n o t i c e of a p p e a l , shall be

22

detained, unless t h e t r i a l judge issues a c e r t i f i c a t e of probable

23

cause and d e t e r m i n e s b y clear and c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e that t h e

24

defendant is n o t likely t o flee d u r i n g p e n d e n c y o f t h e appeal and

25

that the defendant will not pose a danger to the safety of any

1

attorney.—A

certificate—e#—probable—cause

other person

or the community

if released under any of the

conditions set forth in paragraph
(c)

a—a—certificate

(a).

of—probable

cause—is

denied,—feke

defendant shall commence or continue to undergo sentence.

If the

certificate of probable cause is granted?—the court granting the
certificate may continue the defendant in custody at an appropriate
place—of detention,—e&—admit—fehe—defendant—fee—bail

or—release

pending appeal on suitable terms and conditions.—The decision on
the request—of the defendant—for release to bail—±s—subject to
review—by—fe&e—appellate court—&&&—abuse of—discretion.

If the

trial court denies the defendant a certificate of probable cause,
or finds that the defendant is likely to flee or poses a danger to
the safety of any other person or the community and denies release,
the decision may be appealed to the court in which the notice of
appeal of the conviction has been filed.
fd)

f 1)

No certificate of probable cause shall issue except

upon application of the defendant filed with the appropriate
court.
(2)

The application for a certificate of probable cause

shall be in writing and accompanied by a memorandum of law
identifying

the

issues

to

be

presented

on

appeal

and

supporting the defendants position that those issues raise a
substantial Question of law or fact reasonably likely to
result in reversal, an order for a new trial or a sentence
that does not include a term of incarceration in iail or
prison.
2

(3)

1

If

release

is

denied.

a n y appeal

shall

hg

2

accompanied by an affidavit m a d e and signed by counsel for the

3

defendant,

4

represented

5

following:

or by t h e defendant
by counsel.

(k)

6
7

if t h e defendant

T h e affidavit

shall

is not

contain the

A narration of the r e l e v a n t facts developed at

trial:

8

of t h e crime (s)

(Bl A statement

9

of which the

defendant was convicted;
(C)

10
11

A statement setting o u t t h e sentence imposed:

and

12

fP) A statement t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s previously

13

applied

14

forth t h e issues that w e r e p r e s e n t e d t o t h e court, t h e

15

courts ruling and the reasons given in support of the

16

ruling.

17

for a certificate

of p r o b a b l e cause,

setting

fe) A copy of t h e application f o r a certificate of probable

IS

cause

and a copy

of the memorandum

shall

be served

on the

19

prosecuting attorney.

20

reply within 10 days after receipt of t h e a p p l i c a t i o n .

21

on t h e application

22

appropriate court receives the p r o s e c u t i n g a t t o r n e y ' s reply, or if

23

no reply is filed, within 15 days after t h e application is filed

24

with t h e c o u r t .

The prosecuting a r t o r n e v may file a written

shall

be held

3

within

10 days

A hearing
after the

1

(f^

No certificate of probable cause shall issue and thp

2

defendant shall be detained unless the appropriate court finds that

3

the appeal:

4

ID

is not being taken for the purpose of delay: and

5

(2)

raises substantial issues of lav or fact reasonably

6

likely to result in reversal, an order for a new trial or a

7

sentence that does not include a term of incarceration in iail

8

or prison.

9

(a)

If the court determines that the defendant may be

10

released pending appeal, it may release the defendant on the least

11

restrictive condition or combination of conditions that the court

12

determines will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as

13

required and the safety of persons and property in the community,

14

which

15

defendant:

conditions

may

include,

without

limitation,

that

the

16

(1)

is admitted to appropriate bail;

17

(2)

not commit a federal, state or local crime during

18
19

the period of release;
(3)

remain in the custody of a designated person who

20

agrees to assume supervision of the defendant and who agrees

21

to report any violation of a release condition to the court,

22

if the designated person is reasonably able to assure the

23

court that the person will appear as reguired and will not

24

pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the

25

community;

4

1
2

(4)

maintain employment, or if unemployed, actively seek

employment:

3

(5)

maintain or commence an educational program;

4

(6)

abide

5
6

by

specified

restrictions

on

personal

associations, place of abode or travel;
(7)

avoid all contact with the victim or victims of the

7

crime(s), anv witness or witnesses who testified against the

8

defendant

9

concerning the offenses if the appeal results in a reversal or

10
11
12

and

anv potential

(8)

report

testify

law

enforcement agency, pretrial services agency or other agency;

14

f10) refrain

comply with a specified curfew;
from

possessing

a

firearm,

destructive

device or other dangerous weapon;
(11) refrain from possessing or using alcohol, or anv

17

narcotic

13

prescribed by a licensed medical practitioner:

19

might

on a regular basis to a designated

(9)

16

who

an order for a new trial:

13

15

witnesses

drug

or

(12) undergo

other

controlled

available

substance

medical.

except

psychological

as

or

20

psychiatric treatment, including treatment for drug or alcohol

21

abuse or dependency;

22

f!3) execute an agreement to forfeit, upon failing to

23

appear as reguired. such designated property, including money,

24

as is reasonably necessary to assure the appearance of the

25

defendant as required, and post with the court such indicia of

5

1

ownership of the property or such percentage of the money as

2

the court may specify:

3

(14) return to custody for specified hours following

4

release for employment, schooling or other limited purposes;:

5

and
(15) satisfy any other condition that

6
7

necessary

8

reouired and to assure the safety of persons and property in

9

the community.

10

(h)

to assure the appearance

is reasonably

of the defendant as

The court may at any time for good cause shown amend the

11

order granting release to impose additional or different conditions

12

of release.

13

6
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S.B.No.181
Passed February 21,1990
Approved March 12, 1990
Effective April 23,1990
CRIMINAL OFFENSE CHARGES
By Winn L. Richards
AN ACT RELATING TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ENACTING PROVISIONS REGARDING THE CHARGING OF OFFENSES; AND
REQUIRING
THE
CONSTITUTIONAL
TWO-THIRDS VOTE FOR PASSAGE.
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS:
ENACTS:
77-SA-l, (FORMERLY 77-35-9) UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953

ID) l ne proceaure shall be the same as if the prosecution were under a single indictment or information.
(4) (a) If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment or information or by a jomder for trial together, the court shall order an election
of separate trials of separate counts, grant a severance of defendants, or provide other relief as justice
requires.
(b) A defendant's right to severance of offenses or
defendants is waived if the motion is not made at
least five days before trial. In ruling on a motion by
defendant for severance, the court may order the
prosecutor to disclose any statements made by the
defendants which he intends to introduce in evidence at the trial.
Section 2. Repealer.

77-35-9, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 14, LAWS
OF UTAH 1980

Section 77-35-9, Rule 9—Joinder of offenses and
of defendants, as enacted by Chapter 14, Laws of
Utah 1980, is repealed.

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:

Section 3. Two-thirds vote required.

Section 1. Section Enacted.

The amendments to this act take effect only if this
act is approved by two-thirds of all members elected
to each house, as provided in Article VIII, Sec. 4 of
the Utah Constitution.

REPEALS:

Section 77-8a-l, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is
enacted to read:
77-8a-l. Joinder of offenses and of defendants.
(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both,
may be charged in the same indictment or information if each offense is a separate count and if the offenses charged are^
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise
connected together in their commission; or
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme
or plan.
(2) (a) When a felony and misdemeanor are
charged together the defendant is afforded a preliminary hearing with respect to both the misdemeanor and felony offenses.
(b) Two or more defendants may be charged in the
same indictment or information if they are alleged
to have participated in the same act or conduct or in
the same criminal episode.
(c) The defendants may be charged in one or more
counts together or separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count.
(d) When two or more defendants are jointly
charged with any offense, they shall be tried jointly
unless the court in its discretion on motion or otherwise orders separate trials consistent with the interests of justice.
(3) (a) The court may order two or more indictments or informations or both to be tried together if
the offenses, and the defendants, if there is more
than one, could have been joined in a single indictment or information

